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Russia

Russia blames sabotage for new Crimea blasts

Britons held in Ukraine deny being mercenaries

Ukraine hits Russian Wagner mercenary HQ in east

Russia vows to expand relations with North Korea

Russia reopens bond market to friendly traders

Ukraine condemns Russian ‘nuclear blackmail’

Ukraine says it has taken out vital Kherson bridge

Ukraine plant shelling could be ‘much worse than Chernobyl’ Video, 00:01:50 Ukraine plant shelling could be ‘much worse than Chernobyl’

Coronavirus COVID-19 In Russia: Current Situation

That’s a constantly updated post on what’s going on in Russia relative to the coronavirus (COVID-19). We are monitoring media to keep you informed about the number of people tested positive, regions affected, and prevention and quarantine measures taken by authorities. At the moment (April 2021), Russian borders are closed for tourists with some exceptions, air travel significantly restricted.

What’s Going On With Covid In Russia Now

🧪 tested 127.8 million
— total: 4 762 569
— today: 8 780
— recovered: 4 388 008
💀 deaths: 108 232

No self-isolation regime or lockdown in any Russian region or city.

Nearly all the regions have enacted restrictions to limit entertainment.

Many schools and universities are working online only.

As of August 1, 2020, citizens of three countries can fly in Russia without restrictions: Turkey, UK, and Tanzania. Russian citizens can freely travel to these countries too. All other routes, flights, and railway and coach trips to other countries can be conducted by a rather short list of passengers eligible for that, i. e. diplomatic servants.

As of January 27, 2021, Russia opened its borders to Qatar, Finland, Vietnam, and India. This applies to only air travelers. All the flights will be between the capitals of these countries and Moscow. With Finland, St. Petersburg will also be added.

Since late September 2020, Russia has been facing a massive second wave of Covid which seems to be much more powerful than the first one. Almost every day brings a new historic high in positive cases, though, this may happen due to an extensive network of testing. The wave is predicted to last till summer 2021.

Throughout the country travel is not restricted, all flights, railway, and coach trips are conducted as in the pre-COVID times.

Wearing a mask is mandatory in any transport, venue, shop, etc. In street, no mask is required.

Requirements For Foreigners Arriving In Russia

If you are not a Russian citizen and come to Russia you should comply with the following requirements:

— have a negative covid test taken no earlier than three days before the arrival;
— in case you don’t have this test, you should have it taken within three days after the arrival;
— you fill in an application either in Russian or in English while onboard;
— your airline may deny you access to the plane in case you don’t have a negative covid test (contact your airline before travel).

Vaccination Against COVID-19 In Russia

Vaccination for some groups of professions started in Russia in December 2020. On January 18, 2021, a mass vaccination started across the country.

At the moment, Russia has approved three vaccines — EpiVacCorona, KoviVak, and Sputnik V.

All vaccines have gone through only two phases of clinical trials. Formally, it’s the third phase underway now. Sputnik V is reported to be 92 percent effective, EpiVacCorona is 100 percent effective based on the results obtained so far.

Sputnik V protects against all the strains of the coronavirus, the developer said.

Employees of Sputnik V’s developer have been immune for nine months so far.

Any Russian citizen can have a vaccine, that’s free. At the moment, EpiVacCorona is used in a few regions, while Sputnik V is being delivered to all the regions.

During three following months, 33 million doses of Sputnik will be produced to be added to 6.5 million already manufactured. In 2021, nearly 60 percent of Russia’s population will be inoculated, according to the government.

There have been no reports in media or social media so far on severe side-effects or Sputnik-related deaths.

Map Of The Spread Of Coronavirus COVID-19 In The World And Russian Regions (In Russian)

Russian web search engine Yandex has created an online map indicating all major Russian cities having COVID-infected persons and the number of the infected. It also shows the level of isolation measured in numbers from 0 (the worst) to 10 (the best). The map is only in Russian, though it’s intuitively understandable. By clicking on «Распространение» (spread) you will get the numbers of infected. Clicking on «Самоизоляция» (self-isolation) will give the levels of self-isolation. The map can be moved and zoomed in / zoomed out.

Sergey Karaganov: Russia’s new foreign policy, the Putin Doctrine

By Professor Sergey Karaganov, honorary chairman of Russia’s Council on Foreign and Defense Policy, and academic supervisor at the School of International Economics and Foreign Affairs Higher School of Economics (HSE) in Moscow

It seems like Russia has entered a new era of its foreign policy – a ‘constructive destruction’, let’s call it, of the previous model of relations with the West. Parts of this new way of thinking have been seen over the last 15 years – starting with Vladimir Putin’s famous Munich speech in 2007 – but much is only just becoming clear now. At the same time, lackluster efforts to integrate into the western system, while maintaining a doggedly defensive attitude, has remained the general trend in Russia’s politics and rhetoric.

Constructive destruction is not aggressive. Russia maintains it isn’t going to attack anyone or blow them up. It simply doesn’t need to. The outside world provides Russia with more and more geopolitical opportunities for medium-term development as it is. With one big exception. NATO’s expansion and formal or informal inclusion of Ukraine poses a risk to the country’s security that Moscow simply won’t accept.

For now, the West is on course to a slow but inevitable decay, both in terms of internal and external affairs and even the economy. And this is precisely why it has started this new Cold War after almost five hundred years of domination in world politics, the economy, and culture. Especially after its decisive victory in the 1990s to mid-2000s. I believe [1] it will most likely lose, stepping down as the global leader and becoming a more reasonable partner. And not a moment too soon: Russia will need to balance relations with a friendly, but increasingly more powerful China.

Presently, the West desperately tries to defend against this with aggressive rhetoric. It tries to consolidate, playing its last trump cards to reverse this trend. One of those is trying to use Ukraine to damage and neuter Russia. It’s important to prevent these convulsive attempts from transforming into a full-fledged standoff and to counter the current US and NATO policies. They are counterproductive and dangerous, though relatively undemanding for the initiators. We are yet to convince the West that it is only hurting itself.

Another trump card is the West’s dominating role in the existing Euro-Atlantic security system established at a time when Russia was seriously weakened following the Cold War. There’s merit in gradually erasing this system, primarily by refusing to take part in it and play by its obsolete rules, which are inherently disadvantageous to us. For Russia, the western track should become secondary to its Eurasian diplomacy. Maintaining constructive relations with the countries in the western part of the continent may ease the integration into Greater Eurasia for Russia. The old system is in the way, though, and so it should be dismantled.

The critical next step to creating a new system (aside from dismantling the old one) is ‘uniting the lands’. It’s a necessity for Moscow, not a whim.

It would be nice if we had more time to do this. But history shows that, since the collapse of the USSR 30 years ago, few post-Soviet nations have managed to become truly independent. And some may never even get there, for various reasons. This is a subject for a future analysis. Right now, I can only point out the obvious: Most local elites don’t have the historical or cultural experience of state-building. They’ve never been able to become the core of the nation – they didn’t have enough time for this. When the shared intellectual and cultural space disappeared, it hurt small countries the most. The new opportunities to build ties with the West turned out to be no replacement. Those who have found themselves at the helm of such nations have been selling their country for their own benefit, because there’s been no national idea to fight for.

The majority of those countries will either follow the example of the Baltic states, accepting external control, or continue to spiral out of control, which in some cases may be extremely dangerous.

The question is: How to ‘unite’ the nations in the most efficient and beneficial way for Russia, taking into account the tsarist and Soviet experience, when the sphere of influence was extended beyond any reasonable limits and then kept together at the expense of core Russian peoples?

Let’s leave the discussion about the ‘unification’ that history is forcing on us for another day. This time, let’s focus on the objective need to make a tough decision and adopt the ‘constructive destruction’ policy.

The milestones we passed

Today, we see the inception of the fourth era of Russia’s foreign policy. The first one started in the late 1980s, and it was a time of weakness and delusions. The nation had lost the will to fight, people wanted to believe democracy and the West would come and save them [2]. It all ended in 1999 after the first waves of NATO expansion, seen by Russians as a backstabbing move, when the West tore apart what was left of Yugoslavia.

Then Russia started to get up off its knees and rebuild, stealthily and covertly, while appearing friendly and humbled. The US withdrawing from the ABM Treaty signaled its intention to regain its strategic dominance, so the still broke Russia made a fateful decision to develop weapon systems to challenge American aspirations. The Munich speech, the Georgian War, and the army reform, conducted amid a global economic crisis that spelled the end of the western liberal globalist imperialism (the term coined by a prominent expert on international affairs, Richard Sakwa) marked the new goal for Russian foreign policy – to once again become a leading global power that can defend its sovereignty and interests. This was followed by the events in Crimea, Syria, the military build-up, and blocking the West from interfering in Russia’s domestic affairs, rooting out from the public service those who partnered with the West to the disadvantage of their homeland, including by a masterful use of the West’s reaction to those developments. As the tensions keep growing, looking up to the West and keeping assets there becomes increasingly less lucrative.

China’s incredible rise and becoming de-facto allies with Beijing starting in the 2010s, the pivot to the East, and the multidimensional crisis that enveloped the West led to a great shift in political and geoeconomic balance in favor of Russia. This is especially pronounced in Europe. Only a decade ago, the EU saw Russia as a backward and weak outskirts of the continent trying to contend with major powers. Now, it is desperately trying to cling to the geopolitical and geoeconomic independence that is slipping through its fingers.

The ‘back to greatness’ period ended around 2017 to 2018. After that, Russia hit a plateau. The modernization continued, but the weak economy threatened to negate its achievements. People (myself included) were frustrated, fearing that Russia once again was going to “snatch defeat from the jaws of victory.” But that turned out to be another build-up period, primarily in terms of defense capabilities.

Russia has gotten ahead, making sure that for the next decade, it will be relatively invulnerable strategically and capable of “dominating in an escalation scenario” in case of conflicts in the regions within its sphere of interests.

The ultimatum that Russia issued to the US and NATO at the end of 2021, demanding they stop developing military infrastructure near the Russian borders and expansion to the east, marked the start of the ‘constructive destruction’. The goal is not simply to stop the flagging, albeit really dangerous inertia of the West’s geostrategic push, but also to start laying the foundation for a new kind of relations between Russia and the West, different from what we settled on in the 1990s.

Russia’s military capabilities, the returning sense of moral righteousness, lessons learned from past mistakes, and a close alliance with China could mean that the West, which chose the role of an adversary, will start being reasonable, even if not all the time. Then, in a decade or sooner, I hope, a new system of international security and cooperation will be built that will include the whole Greater Eurasia this time, and it will be based on UN principles and international law, not unilateral ‘rules’ that the West has been trying to impose on the world in recent decades.

Correcting mistakes

Before I go any further, let me say that I think very highly of Russian diplomacy – it’s been absolutely brilliant in the past 25 years. Moscow was dealt a weak hand but managed to play a great game nevertheless. First, it didn’t let the West ‘finish it off’. Russia maintained its formal status of a great country, retaining permanent membership in the UN Security Council and keeping nuclear arsenals. Then it gradually improved its global standing by leveraging the weaknesses of its rivals and the strengths of its partners. Building a strong friendship with China has been a major achievement. Russia has some geopolitical advantages that the Soviet Union didn’t have. Unless, of course, it goes back to the aspirations of becoming a global superpower, which eventually ruined the USSR.

However, we shouldn’t forget the mistakes we’ve made so we don’t repeat them. It was our laziness, weakness, and bureaucratic inertia that helped create and keep afloat the unjust and unstable system of European security that we have today.

The beautifully-worded Charter of Paris for a New Europe that was signed in 1990 had a statement about freedom of association – countries could choose their allies, something that would’ve been impossible under the 1975 Helsinki Declaration. Since the Warsaw Pact was running on fumes at that point, this clause meant that NATO would be free to expand. This is the document everyone keeps referring to, even in Russia. Back in 1990, however, NATO could at least be considered a “defense” organization. The alliance and most of its members have launched a number of aggressive military campaigns since then – against the remnants of Yugoslavia, as well as in Iraq and Libya.

After a heart-to-heart chat with Lech Walesa in 1993, Boris Yeltsin signed a document where it stated that Russia “understood Poland’s plan to join NATO.” When Andrey Kozyrev, Russia’s foreign minister at the time, learned about NATO’s expansion plans in 1994, he began a bargaining process on Russia’s behalf without consulting the president. The other side took it as a sign that Russia was OK with the general concept, since it was trying to negotiate acceptable terms. In 1995, Moscow stepped on the brakes, but it was too late – the dam burst and swept away any reservations about the West’s expansion efforts.

In 1997, Russia, being economically weak and completely dependent on the West, signed the Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security with NATO. Moscow was able to compel certain concessions from the West, like the pledge not to deploy large military units to the new member states. NATO has been consistently violating this obligation. Another agreement was to keep these territories free of nuclear weapons. The US would not have wanted it anyway, because it had been trying to distance itself from a potential nuclear conflict in Europe as much as possible (despite their allies’ wishes), since it would undoubtedly cause a nuclear strike against America. In reality, the document legitimized NATO’s expansion.

There were other mistakes – not as major but extremely painful nevertheless. Russia participated in the Partnership for Peace program, the sole purpose of which was to make it look like NATO was prepared to listen to Moscow, but in reality, the alliance was using the project to justify its existence and further expansion. Another frustrating misstep was our involvement in the NATO-Russia Council after the Yugoslavia aggression. The topics discussed at that level desperately lacked substance. They should’ve focused on the truly significant issue – restraining the alliance’s expansion and the buildup of its military infrastructure near the Russian borders. Sadly, this never made it to the agenda. The Council continued to operate even after the majority of NATO members started a war in Iraq and then Libya in 2011.

It is very unfortunate that we never got the nerve to openly say it – NATO had become an aggressor that committed numerous war crimes. This would’ve been a sobering truth for various political circles in Europe, like in Finland and Sweden for example, where some are considering the advantages of joining the organization. And all the others for that matter, with their mantra about NATO being a defense and deterrence alliance that needs to be further consolidated so it can stand against imaginary enemies.

I understand those in the West who are used to the existing system that allows the Americans to buy the obedience of their junior partners, and not just in terms of military support, while these allies can save on security expenses by selling part of their sovereignty. But what do we gain from this system? Especially now that it’s become obvious that it breeds and escalates confrontation at our western borders and in the whole world.

NATO feeds off forced confrontation, and the longer the organization exists, the worse this confrontation will be.

The bloc is a threat to its members as well. While provoking confrontation, it doesn’t actually guarantee protection. It is not true that Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty warrants collective defense if one ally is attacked. This article doesn’t say that this is automatically guaranteed. I am familiar with the history of the bloc and the discussions in America regarding its establishment. I know for a fact that the US will never deploy nuclear weapons to “protect” its allies if there is conflict with a nuclear state.

The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) is also outdated. It is dominated by NATO and the EU that use the organization to drag out the confrontation and impose the West’s political values and standards on everyone else. Fortunately, this policy is becoming less and less effective. In the mid-2010s I had the chance to work with the OSCE Panel of Eminent Persons (what a name!), which was supposed to develop a new mandate for the organization. And if I had my doubts about the OSCE’s effectiveness before that, this experience convinced me that it is an extremely destructive institution. It’s an antiquated organization with a mission to preserve things that are obsolete. In the 1990s, it served as an instrument of burying any attempt made by Russia or others to create a common European security system; in the 2000s, the so-called Corfu Process bogged down Russia’s new security initiative.

Practically all UN institutions have been squeezed out of the continent, including the UN Economic Commission for Europe, its Human Rights Council and Security Council. Once upon a time, the OSCE was viewed as a useful organization that would promote the UN system and principles in a key subcontinent. That didn’t happen.

As for NATO, it is very clear what we should do. We need to undermine the bloc’s moral and political legitimacy and refuse any institutional partnership, since its counterproductivity is obvious. Only the military should continue to communicate, but as an auxiliary channel that would supplement dialogue with the DOD and defense ministries of leading European nations. After all, it’s not Brussels that makes strategically important decisions.

The same policy could be adopted when it comes to the OSCE. Yes, there is a difference, because even though this is a destructive organization, it never initiated any wars, destabilization, or killings. So we need to keep our involvement in this format to a minimum. Some say that this is the only context that provides the Russian foreign minister with a chance to see his counterparts. That is not true. The UN can offer an even better context. Bilateral talks are much more effective anyway, because it is easier for the bloc to hijack the agenda when there is a crowd. Sending observers and peacekeepers through the UN would also make a lot more sense.

The limited article format does not allow me to dwell on specific policies for each European organization, like the Council of Europe for example. But I would define the general principle this way – we partner where we see benefits for ourselves and keep our distance otherwise.

Thirty years under the current system of European institutions proved that continuing with it would be detrimental. Russia doesn’t benefit in any way from Europe’s disposition towards breeding and escalating confrontation or even posing military threat to the subcontinent and the whole world. Back in the day, we could dream that Europe would help us bolster security, as well as political and economic modernization. Instead, they are undermining security, so why would we copy the West’s dysfunctional and deteriorating political system? Do we really need these new values that they have adopted?

We will have to limit the expansion by refusing to cooperate within an eroding system. Hopefully, by taking a firm stand and leaving our civilization neighbors from the West to their own devices, we will actually help them. The elites may return to a less suicidal policy that would be safer for everyone. Of course, we have to be smart about taking ourselves out of the equation and make sure to minimize the collateral damage that the failing system will inevitably cause. But maintaining it in its current form is simply dangerous.

Policies for tomorrow’s Russia

As the existing global order continues to crumble, it seems that the most prudent course for Russia would be to sit it out for as long as possible – to take cover within the walls of its ‘neo-isolationist fortress’ and deal with domestic matters. But this time, history demands that we take action. Many of my suggestions with respect to the foreign policy approach I have tentatively called ‘constructive destruction’ naturally emerge from the analysis presented above.

There is no need to interfere or to try to influence the internal dynamics of the West, whose elites are desperate enough to start a new cold war against Russia. What we should do instead is use various foreign policy instruments – including military ones – to establish certain red lines. Meanwhile, as the Western system continues to steer towards moral, political, and economic degradation, non-Western powers (with Russia as a major player) will inevitably see their geo-political, geo-economic and geo-ideological positions strengthen.

Our Western partners predictably try to squelch Russia’s calls for security guarantees and take advantage of the ongoing diplomatic process in order to extend the lifespan of their own institutions. There is no need to give up dialogue or cooperation in matters of trade, politics, culture, education, and healthcare, whenever it’s useful. But we must also use the time we’ve got to ramp up military-political, psychological, and even military-technical pressure – not so much on Ukraine, whose people have been turned into cannon fodder for a new Cold War – but on the collective West, in order to force it to change its mind and step back from the policies it has pursued for the past several decades. There is nothing to fear about the confrontation escalating: We saw tensions grow even as Russia was trying to appease the Western world. What we should do is prepare for a stronger pushback from the West; also, Russia should be able to offer the world a long-term alternative – a new political framework based on peace and cooperation.

The West can try to intimidate us with devastating sanctions – but we are also capable of deterring the West with our own threat of an asymmetrical response, one that would cripple Western economies and disrupt whole societies.

Naturally, it is useful to remind our partners, from time to time, that there exists a mutually beneficial alternative to all that.

If Russia carries out reasonable but assertive policies (domestically, too), it will successfully (and relatively peacefully) overcome the latest surge of Western hostility. As I have written before, we stand a good chance of winning this Cold War.

What also inspires optimism is Russia’s own past record: We have more than once managed to tame the imperial ambitions of foreign powers – for our own good, and for the good of humanity, as a whole. Russia was able to transform would-be empires into tame and relatively harmless neighbors: Sweden after the Battle of Poltava, France after Borodino, Germany after Stalingrad and Berlin.

We can find a slogan for the new Russian policy toward the West in a verse from Alexander Blok’s ‘The Scythians’, a brilliant poem that seems especially relevant today: “Come join us, then! Leave war and war’s alarms, / And grasp the hand of peace and amity. / While still there’s time, Comrades, lay down your arms! / Let us unite in true fraternity!”

While attempting to heal our relations with the West (even if that requires some bitter medicine), we must remember that, while culturally close to us, the Western world is running out of time – in fact, it has been for two decades now. It is essentially in damage control mode, seeking cooperation whenever possible. The real prospects and challenges of our present and future lie with the East and the South. Taking a harder line with Western nations must not distract Russia from maintaining its pivot to the East. And we have seen this pivot slow down in the past two or three years, especially when it comes to developing territories beyond the Ural Mountains.

We must not allow Ukraine to become a security threat to Russia. That said, it would be counterproductive to spend too many administrative and political (not to mention economic) resources on it. Russia must learn to actively manage this volatile situation, keep it within limits. Most of Ukraine has been neutered by its own anti-national elite, corrupted by the West, and infected with the pathogen of militant nationalism.

It would be much more effective to invest in the East, in the development of Siberia. By creating favorable working and living conditions, we will attract not only Russian citizens, but also people from the other parts of the former Russian Empire, including the Ukrainians. The latter have, historically, contributed a great deal to the development of Siberia.

Let me reiterate a point from my other articles: It was the incorporation of Siberia under Ivan the Terrible that made Russia a great power, not the accession of Ukraine under Aleksey Mikhaylovich, known under the moniker ‘the most peaceful’. It is high time we stopped repeating Zbigniew Brzezinski’s disingenuous – and so strikingly Polish – assertion that Russia cannot be a great power without Ukraine. The opposite is much closer to the truth: Russia cannot be a great power when it is burdened by an increasingly unwieldy Ukraine – a political entity created by Lenin which later expanded westward under Stalin.

The most promising path for Russia lies with the development and strengthening of ties with China. A partnership with Beijing would multiply the potential of both countries many times over. If the West carries on with its bitterly hostile policies, it wouldn’t be unreasonable to consider a temporary five-year defense alliance with China. Naturally, one should also be careful not to get ‘dizzy with success’ on the China track, so as not to return to the medieval model of China’s Middle Kingdom, which grew by turning its neighbors into vassals. We should help Beijing wherever we can to keep it from suffering even a momentary defeat in the new Cold War unleashed by the West. That defeat would weaken us, too. Besides, we know all too well what the West transforms into when it thinks it is winning. It took some harsh remedies to treat America’s hangover after it got drunk with power in the 1990s.

Clearly, an East-oriented policy must not focus solely on China. Both the East and the South are on the rise in global politics, economics, and culture, which is partly due to our undermining of the West’s military superiority – the primary source of its 500-year hegemony.

When the time comes to establish a new system of European security to replace the dangerously outdated existing one, it must be done within the framework of a greater Eurasian project. Nothing worthwhile can be born out of the old Euro-Atlantic system.

It is self-evident that success requires the development and modernization of the country’s economic, technological, and scientific potential – all pillars of a country’s military power, which remains the backbone of any nation’s sovereignty and security. Russia cannot be successful without improving the quality of life for the majority of its people: This includes overall prosperity, healthcare, education, and the environment.

The restriction of political freedoms, which is inevitable when confronting the collective West, must by no means extend to the intellectual sphere. This is difficult, but achievable. For the talented, creatively-minded part of the population who are ready to serve their country, we must preserve as much intellectual freedom as possible. Scientific development through Soviet-style ‘sharashkas’ (research and development laboratories operating within the Soviet labor camp system) is not something that would work in the modern world. Freedom enhances the talents of Russian people, and inventiveness runs in our blood. Even in foreign policy, the freedom from ideological constraints that we enjoy offers us massive advantages compared to our more close-minded neighbors. History teaches us that the brutal restriction of freedom of thought imposed by the Communist regime on its people led the Soviet Union to ruin. Preserving personal freedom is an essential condition for any nation’s development.

If we want to grow as a society and be victorious, it is absolutely vital that we develop a spiritual backbone – a national idea, an ideology that unites and shines the way forward. It is a fundamental truth that great nations cannot be truly great without such an idea at their core. This is part of the tragedy that happened to us in the 1970s and 1980s. Hopefully, the resistance of the ruling elites to the advancement of a new ideology, rooted in the pains of the communist era, is beginning to fade. Vladimir Putin’s speech at the October 2021 annual meeting of the Valdai Discussion Club was a powerful reassuring signal in that respect.

Like the ever-growing number of Russian philosophers and authors, I have put forward my own vision of the ‘Russian idea’[3]. (I apologize for having to reference my own publications again – it is an inevitable side effect of having to stick to the format).

Questions for the future

And now let’s discuss a significant, yet mostly overlooked aspect of the new policy that needs to be addressed. We need to dismiss and reform the obsolete and often harmful ideological foundation of our social sciences and public life for this new policy to get implemented, let alone succeed.

This doesn’t mean we have to reject once again the advancements in political science, economy, and foreign affairs of our predecessors. The Bolsheviks tried to dump the social ideas of tsarist Russia – everybody knows how this played out. We rejected Marxism and were happy about it. Now, fed up with other tenets, we realize we were too impatient with it. Marx, Engels, and Lenin had sound ideas in their theory of imperialism we could use.

Social sciences that study the ways of public and private life have to take into account national context, however inclusive it wants to appear. It stems from the national history and ultimately is aimed to help the nations and/or their government and elites. The mindless application of solutions valid in one country to another are fruitless and only create abominations.

We need to start working towards intellectual independence after we achieve military security and political and economic sovereignty. In the new world, it’s compulsory to achieve development and exert influence. Mikhail Remizov, a prominent Russian political scientist, was the first, as far as I know, to call this ‘intellectual decolonization’.

Having spent decades in the shadow of imported Marxism, we’ve begun a transition to yet another foreign ideology of liberal democracy in economics and political science and, to certain extent, even in foreign policy and defense. This fascination has done us no good – we’ve lost land, technology, and people. In the mid-2000s, we started to exercise our sovereignty, but had to rely on our instincts rather than clear national (again – it cannot be anything else) scientific and ideological principles.

We still don’t have the courage to acknowledge that the scientific and ideological worldview we’ve had for the last forty to fifty years is obsolete and/or was intended to serve foreign elites.

To illustrate this point, here are a few randomly picked questions from my very long list.

I’ll start with existential issues, purely philosophical ones. What comes first in humans, the spirit or the matter? And in the more mundane political sense – what drives people and states in the modern world? To common Marxists and liberals, the answer is the economy. Just remember that until recently Bill Clinton’s famous “It’s the economy, stupid” was thought to be an axiom. But people seek something greater when the basic need for food is satisfied. Love for their family, their homeland, desire for national dignity, personal freedoms, power, and fame. The hierarchy of needs has been well known to us since Maslow introduced it in the 1940–50s in his famous pyramid. Modern capitalism, however, twisted it, forcing ever-expanding consumption via traditional media at first and all-encompassing digital networks later – for rich and poor, each according to their ability.

What can we do when the modern capitalism deprived of moral or religious foundations incites limitless consumption, breaking down moral and geographic boundaries and comes into conflict with nature, threatening the very existence of our species? We, Russians, understand better than anybody that attempts to get rid of entrepreneurs and capitalists who are driven by the desire to build wealth will have disastrous consequences for society and the environment (the socialist economy model wasn’t exactly environmentally friendly).

What do we do with the latest values of rejecting history, your homeland, gender, and beliefs, as well as aggressive LGBT and ultra-feminist movements? I respect the right to follow them, but I think they’re post-humanist. Should we treat this as just another stage of social evolution? I don’t think so. Should we try to ward it off, limit its spread, and wait till society lives through this moral epidemic? Or should we actively fight it, leading the majority of humanity that adheres to so-called “conservative” values or, to put it simply, normal human values? Should we get into the fight escalating an already dangerous confrontation with the Western elites?

The technological development and increased labor productivity have helped feed the majority of people, but the world itself has slipped into anarchy, and many guiding principles have been lost at the global level. Security concerns, perhaps, are prevailing over the economy once again. Military instruments and the political will might take the lead from now on.

What is military deterrence in the modern world? Is it a threat to cause damage to national and individual assets or foreign assets and information infrastructure to which today’s Western elites are tied so closely? What will become of the Western world if this infrastructure is brought down?

And a related question: What is strategic parity we still talk about today? Is it some foreign nonsense picked by Soviet leaders who sucked their people into an exhausting arms race because of their inferiority complex and June 22, 1941 syndrome? Looks like we are already answering this question, even though we still churn out speeches about equality and symmetrical measures.

And what is this arms control many believe to be instrumental? Is it an attempt to restrain the expensive arms race beneficial to the wealthier economy, to limit the risk of hostilities or something more – a tool to legitimize the race, the development of arms, and the process of unnecessary programs on your opponent? There’s no obvious answer to that.

But let’s go back to the more existential questions.

Is democracy really the pinnacle of political development? Or is it just another tool that helps the elites control society, if we are not talking about Aristotle’s pure democracy (which also has certain limitations)? There are many tools that come and go as society and conditions change. Sometimes we abandon them only to bring them back when the time is right and there’s external and internal demand for them. I’m not calling for boundless authoritarianism or monarchy. I think we have already overdone it with centralization, especially at the municipal government level. But if this is just a tool, shouldn’t we stop pretending that we strive for democracy and put it straight – we want personal freedoms, a prosperous society, security, and national dignity? But how do we justify power to the people then?

Is the state really destined to die off, as Marxists and liberal globalists used to believe, as they dreamed of alliances between transnational corporations, international NGOs (both have been going through nationalization and privatization), and supranational political bodies? We’ll see how long the EU can survive in its current form. Note that I don’t want to say there’s no reason to join national efforts for the greater good, like bringing down expensive custom barriers or introducing joint environmental policies. Or isn’t it better to focus on developing your own state and supporting neighbors while disregarding global problems created by others? Aren’t they going to mess with us if we act this way?

What is the role of land and territories? Is it a dwindling asset, a burden as was believed among political scientists only recently? Or the greatest national treasure, especially in the face of the environmental crisis, climate change, the growing deficit of water and food in some regions and the total lack of it in others?

What should we do then with hundreds of millions of Pakistanis, Indians, Arabs, and others whose lands might soon be uninhabitable? Should we invite them now as the US and Europe began to do in the 1960s, drawing migrants to bring down the cost of local labor and undermine the trade unions? Or should we prepare to defend our territories from the outsiders? In that case, we should abandon all hope to develop democracy, as Israel’s experience with its Arab population shows.

Would developing robotics, which is currently in a sorry state, help compensate for the lack of workforce and make those territories livable again? What is the role of indigenous Russian people in our country, considering their number will inevitably keep shrinking? Given that Russians have historically been an open people, the prospects might be optimistic. But so far it’s unclear.

I can go on and on, especially when it comes to the economy. These questions need to be asked and it’s vital to find answers as soon as possible in order to grow and come out on top. Russia needs a new political economy – free from Marxist and liberal dogmas, but something more than the current pragmatism our foreign policy is based on. It must include forward-oriented idealism, a new Russian ideology incorporating our history and philosophical traditions. This echoes the ideas put forward by the academic Pavel Tsygankov.

I believe that this is the ultimate goal of all our research in foreign affairs, political science, economics and philosophy. This task is beyond difficult. We can continue contributing to our society and our country only by breaking our old thinking patterns. But to end on an optimistic note, here’s a humorous thought: Isn’t it time to recognize that the subject of our studies – foreign affairs, domestic policies, and the economy – is the result of a creative process involving masses and leaders alike? To recognize that it is, in a way, art? To a large degree, it defies explanation and stems from intuition and talent. And so we are like art experts: We talk about it, identify trends and teach the artists – the masses and the leaders – history, which is useful to them. We often get lost in the theoretical, though, coming up with ideas divorced from reality or distorting it by focusing on separate fragments.

Sometimes we do make history: think Evgeny Primakov or Henry Kissinger. But I’d argue they didn’t care what approaches to this art history they represented. They drew upon their knowledge, personal experience, moral principles, and intuition. I like the idea of us being a type of art expert, and I believe it can make the daunting task of revising the dogmas a little easier.

This article was first published online by the Russia in Global Affairs journal.

What is going on in Russia? The views and values of ordinary Russians

Subject: What is going on in Russia? The views and values of ordinary Russians
Date: Thu, 17 Dec 2015
From: Karen Hewitt

I am attaching the talk which I have given (with adaptations) to various groups of non-professionals who are interested in Russia. Some professionals in the audience, sometimes, but it was not intended for them.

What is going on in Russia?
The views and values of ordinary Russians

(2nd July 2015)
By Karen Hewitt
Lecturer,Oxford University Department of Continuing Education

I have spent the last 26 years trying to explain Britain to the Russians and – to a more hesitant extent – Russia to the British. Since I spend up to two months a year in cities all over Russia, living and talking with Russians, and not seeing or speaking to other westerners, I may misunderstand a lot, but I am not like a journalist looking for a story and listening to other journalists.

What we hear in Britain – and in Western media generally – about what is going on in Russia is so different from what I observe in all those cities and towns, in the universities and schools and public offices, in the shops and markets that I feel an obligation to challenge our media. The situation has been hugely exacerbated by the Ukraine crisis – in which outrageous things have been said on both sides – but with far less evidence and far more falsification on the ‘Western side’. That there are significant lies in the mass media of both countries is clear. That there is disturbing ignorance on our side is clear. So I decided to be more systematic than usual in exploring what ordinary thoughtful Russians believed was going on. To ask lots of questions and to take lots of notes.

A brief history of Russia as seen by Russians since the 1970s.

Many generations among my correspondents but this background should help

Anyone born in the Soviet Union in the 1960s and 1970s would have spent their childhood in a predictable world. They had a home, albeit often a communal home, food, electricity and (usually) running water, paid employment, serious education, a national health service, cheap travel within the country, long holidays in the summer, and an ethos which encouraged ‘joining’ things and doing things together. Lots of summer camps, lots of sport, lots of group ‘voluntary work’, lots of joint projects in which grown-ups and children joined (such as building community centres.)

This life was reassuring in many ways. It did not encourage individual decisions, work based on enterprise and personal initiative. It did not encourage dissent. By European standards (though not by the standards of most of the world) what was available in homes and domestic products was limited and shoddy; stepping out of line could be and often was punished though with nothing like the widespread ferocity of the Stalin years. For most grown-ups it was a matter of looking over your shoulder and teaching your children to be discreet. But for most children themselves, the virtues of the Soviet system – stability, lots of attention to children as a group, and a firm ideology or belief couched in optimistic and cheerful terms – gave them a happy childhood.

In my early years in Russia (I went first in 1984) and then annually or more often from 1988) I was at first suspicious of these widely prevalent accounts of happy childhoods. What about those who were often unhappy or traumatised – by families, by individuals, by social expectations?. The Soviet Union must have had numbers of unhappy children, especially those trapped by illness or the alcoholism of their parents. But the system was child-friendly in its values and practices. The difficulties and restraints become much more obvious as those children grew up – if you were somebody who wanted to argue, who wanted to go your own way, who wanted to take initiatives or who loathed committees.

Most adults were probably reasonably content within work groups – and there was work for everyone, even if it was not very strenuous and involved long holidays; going on holiday in groups was also normal. More people were able to move out of communal flats where they had just one room of their own into their own flats. In terms of getting hold of things – the system worked like a black market – a deficit market – people learnt how to use the system. Prosperity seemed to be gently increasing even as Brezhnev slept.

But Brezhnev died in 1982 by which time the economic problems of the Soviet system were becoming all too obvious, at least to those in power. He was followed by Andropov who died in 1984 and Chernenko who died in 1985, leaving the way clear for Mikhail Gorbachev to become General Secretary and hence leader of the Soviet Union. Russians – and the other Soviet peoples – were about to enter years and years of chaos after decades of stability and stagnation.

Gorbachev had to deal with the consequences of economic stagnation and the collapsing price of oil. There were no resources left. He tried to liberalise markets – and politics. Political liberalisation was more exciting, especially for educated people, and went far farther than anyone had envisaged, very quickly. That’s what most Westerners remember.

But how does anyone turn a black market into a capital market? If what you can buy is regulated by a lack of goods rather than a lack of money, how do you free up and double or treble your domestic production – and keep some kind of control of money so that people learn what you can spend and what you have to save. How, in fact, to change totally the relationship between work, productivity and money, if the people governing the country and trying to do this have had no experience of our kind of economy and social structures?

The Soviet perestroika reforms meant that people started losing their jobs. People were paid less. Inflation took hold. But at the same time there was nothing in the shops, because if you were controlling supplies and it seemed likely that they price would go up, you held back the goods in the warehouses. People were worried about the increasing lack of control and responsibility as other people started showing initiative.

For at least two years before the Soviet Union was broken up – deliberately by Soviet leaders – in December 1991 – people were getting more and more confused by different economic and value systems that were co-existing, though they made no sense operating together.

On 2nd January 1992, Yeltsin, now President of the Russian Federation, divorced now from all those other countries which had made up the Soviet Union, declared that prices were liberalised. Sellers could charge what they wanted. With a few exceptions prices would not be controlled by the state. (Rather too late, he realised that in fact state assets technically belonged to the people.) By the time his advisers had devised vouchers for the population so that they could realise some of their assets, the vast wealth of the country was in the hands of really clever ruthless entrepreneurs – the people whom we call ‘oligarchs’ and their slightly lesser ranks of the very rich, called ‘New Russians’. Naturally these people were helped by the advisers who flooded in from Western countries and who were eager to turn Russia into a ‘Western-style’ country which would be helped/controlled by experienced ‘democracies’. (Lots of money was put into Russia to help with developing civil society, but it was a tiny fraction of the money put into Russia in order to exploit an economic situation which was devastating the population.) And so began what the Russian refer to as ‘the nineties’.

The country suffered hyperinflation and therefore the people lost all their savings; they lost their jobs; industry collapsed as did the agricultural farms. One disaster fuelled another: for example the Soviet welfare system vanished since it made no sense in a new entrepreneurial world. The creaky but universal national health service was – Russians were told – not the way to solve health problems. Everyone except the British explained you should privatise the health system – which meant that most people could not afford doctors except those brave doctors who went on working without pay. Nobody could pay the school teachers either, but teachers were old ladies who went on working anyway, and who were officially despised for it.

Most of the population lived on organic vegetables grown on their own dacha plots. But they could buy Mars bars and Snickers bars and increasingly cheap computers which the children demanded. Meanwhile the shops began to fill with posh foreign goods bought with dollars by those (mostly in Moscow) who had managed to land jobs with foreign firms. So this society which had in Soviet times been based on pretty equal distribution of wealth became the most unequal of societies – the fabulously rich; the very rich, and the vast majority of the struggling poor who wondered every month whether they would get paid. And then the homeless.

The death rate shot up – the majority of men were dying before they reached 60 – of illness, alcohol, joblessness, and essentially of broken hearts. The birth rate went right down: why have babies in this chaos? And there was no cheerful ideology to keep people together. In fact there was no coherent system of values at all which, even when most people are essentially decent, is deeply traumatising.

By 1997, with Yeltsin, an alcoholic in thrall to the squabbling courtiers around him, the economy looked briefly as if it was slowly normalising. Inflation had come down to, say, 25% – and people were finding ways to work. But then there were world economic convulsions, and Russia (by now hugely in debt to the money institutions of the world) defaulted on its debts in 1998. Once again there was serious inflation and this time – because foreign investors were affected – the world took notice. But the Russian population mostly laughed. They had lost all their savings, their assets, their right to public assets and their security six years earlier. They had little or nothing left to lose. And so Russia staggered into 1999, with the people, on the whole, disillusioned, confused, ashamed and exhausted. At the very end of 1999, Yeltsin announced that he was resigning, and that, until proper elections should take place, he was appointing someone else to take over – someone virtually unknown to the people – Vladimir Putin.

Putin has been in power as President for 11 years, and in tandem with President Medvedev for 4 years from 2008-2012. From the Western point of view – for reasons which are, I think, deep in US geopolitics, Putin was rather quickly demonised.

From the point of view of ordinary Russians he brought stability, coherent policies and a doubling, trebling, of their personal incomes and the wealth of Russia. He made the oligarchs pay taxes, he broke up some of the illegal empires of energy wealth and nationalised them, He dealt with local warlords in distant parts of the Russian federation and insisted that governors should be appointed from Moscow, so that he could keep an eye on them. With the oil money his government built up a huge emergency reserve so that it would never again be the basket-case of world economies, and he and his ministers devised and largely carried out federal-wide improvement projects in Education, Health, Agriculture and Infrastructure. People are hugely better off than they were, and although of course there are plenty of poor people, they too are better off than they were. (The homeless have gone from the streets of Perm, where – as with everywhere else in Russia) they were obvious and pitiful and shameful to their fellow-citizens in the 1990s.) Not all of this is attributable to the policies of the Government, still less to President Putin – oil prices are important – but from the ordinary Russian’s point of view, they have much to be thankful for under Putin.

There is more censorship than there was in Yeltsin’s years when there was no censorship at all – about anything. There are opposition websites and some newspapers but other opposition newspapers have their editors replaced by the authorities. There are state television channels which follow the government line with daily focus on the President and the kind of ‘analysis’ by which the decisions of the government are always shown to be correct; on the other hand, these news programmes show – on the whole – more of what is going on in the world than our national BBC programmes, for example.

[As for other domestic problems: I have yet to hear a teacher in higher education in Russia who does not complain about the Minister of Higher Education, the lowering of standards, the lack of attention to the humanities, the chasing after money rather than scholarship, etc etc. (When I tell these indignant people that you can hear exactly the same complaints in Britain, they are astounded. Surely Britain is a civilised country. )

Corruption is also a complaint: why haven’t Putin and Medvedev done more to combat it? In fact they are doing something. Russia is slowly – but too slowly – climbing up the list where the least corrupt nations are at the top. 136 out of 175 countries. But there are interesting observations by ordinary Russians about this corruption.]

So where are we now: or rather where were we in late February 2014 when the crisis in Ukraine erupted.?

What can I say about this which won’t be shouted down by one side or the other?

Ukraine is an unhappy country, put together out of several large areas with different histories, cultures, faiths and loyalties. In 23 years its leaders, mostly quarrelling oligarchs from all sides, have failed to think about Ukraine as a pluralist country that can develop its own pluralist sense of pride. The economy has dropped more than that of any other post-Soviet country and many people live in real desperate poverty.

Ukraine is related to Russia. If you ask how – my analogy is to say: take Wales, Scotland, Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland, roll them into one and say this is a nation which has a long, long relationship with England. Imagine what you would say about that. It would not be easy. Ukraine’s relationship with Russia is intimate, historical, full of love and solidarity, but damaged by bitterness and a sense of oppression. Lots and lots of family and friends on both sides. And three million Ukrainians working in Russia.

Now for the questions which I have asked Russians – hundreds of Russians from the Arctic to the Caucasus, from Smolensk across European Russia, across the Urals, to Siberia and on to the far east, to Vladivostok. I have been to all these places and I have talked. I have extensive notes. But I know that I can be biased as we all can, in what I want to hear. So I circulated about 300 university teachers of English with 8 questions, and asked them – entirely optionally – for their answers and those of their friends and relations. Later I turned the questions into Russian and asked especially for the opinions of men. As a result I have about 70 detailed answers from teachers, lawyers, engineers, IT specialists, business people, journalists, students, pensioners. Educated people – so not sociologically accurate BUT typical, it seems to me, in the range of answers and the kind of answers that they give.

Some people would say that in their answers, these ordinary thoughtful Russians were unduly influenced by mass-media propaganda. To that I would say two things: a startlingly high proportion of Russians use the internet and watch foreign TV channels. They have access to many sources of information and misinformation – more than their British equivalents. And even more important, millions and millions of Russians including probably more than 50% of this sample have friends and relations in Ukraine whom they phone or write to or skype with, often daily. They are living in a complicated connected world. Of course their views are not just parroted.

(1) Are you more or less satisfied with the annexation of Crimea? The vast majority, about 9 out of 10 approved of Crimea seceding from Ukraine. They objected to my word, ‘annexation’. The Crimea used to belong to Russia, its inhabitants had long wanted to return to Russia, they held a referendum and they voted to leave Ukraine and then – to ask Russia to accept the autonomous republic as part of the Russian Federation.

Although Russian special forces popped up all over the place, no violence took place and no-one was killed. (I was surprised that my respondents did not make much more of the peaceful change of power)

The Russians said ‘It was right to let them decide: they have decided.’

A number complained that their own hard-earned salaries were being taxed to pay for economic aid to Crimea. This was not ideal for Russia and some of my respondents should be put down as ‘against the inclusion of Crimea’. But they did not doubt that it was a very good move for the people of Crimea.

One or two pointed out that probably the main aim of the Russian government which was certainly active in the process, was to ensure the integrity of Sevatopol.

As for the small minority of those who disapproved, they did not explain Why – except one who said that it was against international law. Perhaps the others felt the same objection, but they answered with a vigorous ‘No’, and left comments and explanations to those who supported what happened.

I spoke at length to a thoughtfully sardonic Crimean teacher who said ‘Most of us voted to leave Ukraine and then to join Russia because we were terrified of becoming victims of violence like the wretched eastern Ukrainians. Even in those early days we could see what was happening as the Kiev government turned against the people in Donbass. And we said, No way! We must escape that. So thank you East Ukrainians for showing us what would have been our fate!

She said the Crimean Tartars were worried at first, but after a year most of them have stopped being worried.

(2) Would the Annexation of eastern Ukraine be a good idea. A large majority said, ‘Certainly not! What for? Russia has never sought to grab eastern Ukraine which belongs to another country – utterly unlike Crimea.’ This big majority insisted that this was an internal problem which Ukraine must sort out for itself. But of course this opinion, pure as it might be is difficult – remember my analogy with Scotland/Wales/Northern Ireland/Ireland. Many Russians frequently expressed pity for the victims. And many knew relations and friends in the Donetsk and Lugansk separatist regions who were hoping for some kind of support.

A year ago, answers such as ‘It is nothing to do with us.’ ‘It is unimaginable that we would invade Ukraine’ were even more common. In April last year (2014) I met no-one who thought that Russia would or should invade eastern Ukraine. But my most recent responses have included some long and thoughtful ruminations on the problem. Only one said firmly, ‘Invade Ukraine and bring the civil war there to a quick halt!’ and one said ‘ so many people are suffering, so many civilians. Perhaps we ought to do something to avoid genocide.’ But there was more of ‘If the separatists think they can no longer live within Ukraine, after a year of fighting, what should Russia do then? If there is no hope for peace?’

Here is one such response.

‘I honestly do not know. The Ukrainian government is set on not granting any degree of autonomy to the region, and the Russian language has been denied the status of the second official language consistently, despite the fact that a large proportion (more than half according to some sources, both Russian and foreign) of the population there speaks Russian as their first language. However, to me that does not mean that Russia should take over by military force, as this would be an invasion of another country’s territory, which is completely inacceptable. At the same time, I am appalled at the double-standard the EU has shown in this matter: while upholding the rights of ethnic minorities in European countries, the EU openly supports a government that discriminates against their own people. I believe that the Russian government is right to apply political and economic leverage in order to support the large Russian community in Eastern Ukraine.’

Two people took what I would call a Ukrainian line. They explained that the east Ukrainian separatists are ‘terrorists’.

And various people in Rostov who are going backwards and forwards across the frontier pointed out that after a year of fighting, the militias fighting for Donetsk and the separatists were almost as bad as the Ukrainian Nazi militias.

Several respondents had experience of the refugees who came to Russia. One said that 19 members of her husbands family had now moved across the border to Russia where they had relatives. Maybe they were not exactly refugees – but they had left their homes and jobs and ordinary life to escape to Russia. [I have personally interviewed at length a shy 20-year-old refugee from Ukraine, living now in Perm. His own story showed that militias (probably on both sides) lose all sense after a time. ]

(3) Do you believe your government when it says the Russian army is not fighting in Ukraine?

This was a tricky question. Few people simply said, ‘I believe them’ or ‘they are liars’. They all know that ‘the West’ accuses Russia of using its military to destabilise Ukraine. They all know that Putin and his ministers say this is not true. So who is right?
Some people said ‘I know lots of people in the army and they do not know anyone who is fighting in Ukraine. Rumours are bound to be flying about, so if they say they know nothing, then there aren’t any soldiers there.’

Another argument was as follows:

‘The claim is true. I’m not a person to take on trust whatever the authorities and mass media say. I’ve witnessed bitter moments of blinding my nation (Afghanistan, Chechnya), but those lies were evident: mothers buried their sons in Siberia, Nizhny Novgorod, Volgograd, Rostov, Ekaterinburg… and with that, you understand, the army presence in an aria was impossible to conceal. I’m 45 now and belong to the generation of mothers whose sons are draft age. Since 2014 I’ve heard of not a single case of a mother losing her son in military operations in Donbass.’
[In fact mothers have protested, but there have been small numbers, and government efforts to suppress comment. So that isn’t quite true. ]

Others said, ‘Of course the Russian army isn’t there. If they were they could defeat Ukraine in a week. OR Why doesn’t the Kiev government present proof – photos, satellite evidence, captured prisoners. Not just two prisoners and five passports, – as if soldiers would have their passports anyway. The Americans keep talking about this huge Russian army, but they have not seen it, and they cannot identify it.

A lot of people said, ‘I don’t know’.

Many said – ‘we know that there are Russian volunteers. I know of people who have volunteered to help the east Ukrainians.’

And who are these volunteers? Well they may be enthusiastic idealistic students; friends have talked to me of several such students and have described their accounts. Other comments: If there are real army people there, I bet they have been sent by exasperated officers who want us to DO something. Not chief command, but lower down where they feel Russia is not responding to a disaster as it should do.

Some one said: I know those boys who drive the lorries full of humanitarian aid to Donetsk. They are not against the aid but they are so frustrated. ‘Why let the Ukrainian militias destroy all these civilians without responding.’ And somebody else said ‘Veterans can’t live without war. If they were professional soldiers once they will get to Ukraine somehow. ‘

But is the Russian government lying?

One inspired person said – ‘I think what they say is 80% true.

And here is a provincial journalist who seems to know what he is talking about:

‘It was a habit in the USSR to conceal the presence of its military in war zones. [He gives examples] People living in Russia well understand their recent history. They know that if our weapons are fired in Ukraine, there are Russian soldiers firing them. Not the army, not thousands of companies, not whole divisions. Not the airforce, not ballistic missiles. But special forces, signallers, reconnaissance troops, tank drivers. They are there. Not in the statistics. But the coffins arrive back in Russia.

I suspect that respondent saying ‘it’s 80% true’ would agree with him. Small numbers of special forces. The Russian government is 20% lying. Others, in their answers suggest something similar.

‘I think it’s not completely true. It would be a lie to say, that there are large groups of Russian soldiers fighting for Donbass, but it would also be a lie to deny Russian army’s participation. I do not know to which extend our army is involved and it’s hard to find out amongst all this propaganda from both sides. But still I believe, that most of rebels fighting for Donbass are Donbass people.’

And then comes the troubled justification.

‘It is hard for me to judge as, obviously, we are brainwashed (as well as all the others). I think there might be someone from Russia fighting in Donbass but I also think people from Donbass need someone to help them. What we see is the Ukrainian government oppressing the Russian population in their historically multicultural country. For me it’s like oppressing people who speak French in Canada. Europe is not willing to help Donbass and when I see (on TV) the civilian population of Donbass (the old, women and children) being killed by the Ukrainian government I can’t but justify the presence of Russians in Donbass helping their “brothers”.’

(4) What more of practical action can Russia take to help solve the crisis in Ukraine?

The minority who thought that Russia was actively meddling in Donbass said ‘Withdraw all our military, and the Ukrainians will defeat the separatists, so the war will stop.’ Or ‘Russia wants a destablised Ukraine under its control. So it does not want the war to stop.’ I had perhaps 3 answers like that. I wrote to one of the respondents asking if he could explain how a destablised Ukraine could be in the interests of Russia: expensive, messy, very unpopular with the majority of Russians, inviting the wrath of western countries, and ruining even further the Ukrainian economy so that it cannot pay it debts to Russia. My respondent replied that there were several theories – he listed 7 – all of them ingenious, far-fetched, and miles from real-politik which is what Putin is usually accused of.

Many people mentioned continuing humanitarian aid – which is getting more urgent, not less; decent treatment of refugees, long-term visitors and immigrants from Ukraine.

The gloom included assumptions about American intentions. ‘The war will not stop because the US does not want it to stop. Probably the EU would like it to stop, but the EU is – and has been for a long time – America’s poodle.”

‘I think that Russia has done more than enough. In 1995 Russia managed not to fully stop, but at least kick start the peace process in Chechnya at the very brink of obvious military victory over the Islamists. Still our government was wise enough to see further than immediate political gain. So Poroshenko’s team as well as other negotiators have a lot to learn from Russia who, unlike many countries in Europe knows how to deal with such problems. I think that Poroshenko had better chances in the beginning when Donbass claimed more autonomy for local authorities and especially tax freedoms. The situation is worse now. It would be best for both parties to stop fighting and start negotiating. Jaw-jaw is always better than war-war. But nobody cares.’

One person was blunt: ‘I don’t know what Russia can do. But I’m sure that to stop artillery firing in the east Ukraine there will be enough one telephone call to Ukraine from the US.’

(5) What about the sanctions. Should they be lifted?

Three months ago I was in a car with a lawyer aged about 60. The conversation had turned to sanctions. The lawyer was rapidly becoming apoplectic, not so much with rage as with the extreme frustration of the intelligent having to deal with the stupid. He kept taking his hands off the wheel, and I feared that we might be serious victims of this international device to make Russia ‘behave’.

‘Sanctions!’ said my friend. ‘What on earth have sanctions to do with us! We didn’t start the war! We are not prosecuting the war! The war is being fought on Ukrainian territory by Ukrainians against other Ukrainians. By what logic should the US impose sanctions on Russia which has nothing to do with the trouble that America itself stirred up. How are we to blame?’

If in less vigorous terms, that view is almost universal. Even the strong anti-Russian-Government respondents think that the sanctions are illogical, ineffective, and causing unnecessary trouble to business trying to develop internationally. The pain to ordinary people has been the Russian government’s reverse sanctions in which food from the EU is barred from entering Russia. Interestingly no-one objected to this in the sense of saying that the Russian response should be abolished. Sanctions and counter-sanctions were part of the package.

Almost nobody expected them to be lifted; people regularly pointed out that the US is not hurt by them, and wishes to go on hurting Russia, while the EU is hurt by them, and many European countries, let alone their businesses and producers would like to see them lifted, but the EU is America’s poodle. (This view is certainly drawn largely from Russian media and propaganda. It also happens to be true.)

Given that they are here to stay, how have sanctions affected ordinary Russians. There was a distinct divide between the responses of people from Moscow and St Petersburg and those of the rest of the country. The people in the capitals miss the foreign cheeses, and chocolate and the doubling of the cost of foreign travel. Most of the rest of the country is less troubled: I couldn’t afford those foreign goods anyway. I always buy Russian food and there is plenty of it and it is good.

Also, many people argued that the sanctions have thrown the Russian economy back on its own resources and productions. So there are more local businesses, more initiative, less dependence on imports generally. So the sanctions are actually improving the economy.

Now that last point is certainly part of what the government tells the people. I don’t know how far it is true. Probably the government doesn’t know either, because Russia is a huge country. But one or two people mentioned specific new activities in their areas.

Everyone said that prices had gone up – partly because of sanctions, partly because of low oil prices. But this was part of life. No financial difficulties were like the disasters of 15 years ago. A nuisance, a tightening of belts, a pulling-together.

It’s strange but the fact is that sanctions imposed on Russia have united our country.

Or from someone more sceptical, and in other answers critical of the government:

‘If you hate Putin, punish him, but if you hate all the Russians, we will also hate you. The most severe sanctions were imposed after the MH-17 tragedy. [The Malaysian airliner crash] The West was not right. We don’t know who was really to blame! The other sanctions have not much angered me and my friends. I hope the sanctions will be lifted.’

NOW FOR FOUR MORE GENERAL QUESTIONS.

Question 6. Is a drawing together of the Russian Orthodox Church and State a good idea?

I got a wide range of answers to this, but rather little analysis. If I divide them into three, the smallest group – but still a reasonable number – said ‘Surely this is a good thing’. ‘What is the problem?” ‘Russians have always been spiritual’.

The next group – a third, say – said that they did not understand my question because they did not recognize the situation. The Russian Constitution insists on a separation of Church and State; different religions are recognized within the constitution; the political elite sometimes make official visits to Mosques and Buddhist temples and Synagogues as well as the Orthodox Church with which a big majority of the ethnic Russian population identify. The papers publish photos of political leaders with lots of leaders of different faiths: that is part of acknowledging the varied cultures that make up the Russian Federation. Russia is – and is recognized – as a multi-faith and no-faith culture.

Many pointed out that they thought of themselves as Russian Orthodox, but this was for them a cultural identification rather than a spiritual one. They didn’t expect to go to Church, but it was useful for the soul to take the fast seriously. [Fasting in Lent has recently become almost an obsession; I am in Russia during April each year, and so I arrive at the height of the Fasting Season. Fasting means cutting out meat, butter and dairy produce, sometimes fish but rarely alcohol. So in the bakery they will warn you that such and such a loaf is not good for Lent Fasting because it contains milk; in restaurants and in canteens there are special Lent menus. With a mixture of moaning and enthusiasm much of the population joins in, at least during the week before Orthodox Easter. Then they have huge feasts with eggs and special decorated cakes and a glorious cream cheese dish flavoured with many good things. At such moments many Russians will look at you solemnly and say they are Orthodox at heart – but in the next breath they can begin to mock fat corrupt priests.]

Anyway, this group can’t understand my question because they don’t really think it is happening.

And then a slightly larger group admit that they are worried. Most of them are not worried very much. When I have asked friends who are religious themselves, they have shaken their heads slowly and said, ‘ I don’t like it. I think religion is a private thing and it is no part of my religion to be reflected in what our government does.’

Others – non-believers – were more scathing. The Orthodox Church is an institution which is always trying to get more power. That’s a tendency in all countries but it should be resisted.

Several said that the Orthodox Church is now de facto an arm of government – ‘And what I hate most about it is that these elites used to be atheists and now they adore the church.’
and
‘It’s a very worrying influence, mostly due to the Russian Orthodox Church’s long connections to the FSB (former KGB).’

The actual views that the Church seeks to impose on the people – or at least it declares its position with seeming Kremlin complicity – include strong disapproval of gay people, strong disapproval of ‘western moral standards’, and a belief that Russia must take its own spiritual path. Which tends to proud isolationism.

So some of the objections by this group are to ‘Mediaeval opinions – but what can you expect of the Church?;’ resentment that any institution is telling you what to do with that kind of authority; attacks on the assumption that there is a connection between the Church and the 144 million Russians – who are diverse with diverse opinions. Still, this moderate answer was most typical.

‘I don’t think it’s a good idea. But right now (as I see it) Russian people do not see any threat in that. A lot of people from Russia do not believe in saintliness of clergy. We have seen a lot of photographs in our press and blogosphere showing priests in luxurious cars and wearing hugely expensive cloaks. We may go to church, we may skip church. It’s not a big deal. That’s why most of us do not care about the problem.’

That was certainly the view of students in classes where I asked the question. ‘No big deal.’

Finally I had several respondents who retorted, reasonably enough – What about your Queen in Westminster Abbey? What about your Archbishop in Canterbury? Our constitution is secular; yours is not.

Questions 7 and 8 On Active students and on the Immortal Legion.

These were alternative Questions; I was wanting to find out if there was an increase of civic activity in Russia recently, and 3 people from 3 different cities spontaneously mentioned the increased enthusiasm of their students. But the question was obviously irrelevant for non-university respondents so I replaced it by one about the Immortal Legion walks on Victory Day. Neither turned out to be an ideal question but they raised some interesting points.

Plenty of university teachers said that students are students, they vary, some years are more active than others; they are ignorant and immature except for a few…. ‘A very dull lot this year…’ Etc.

But a significant number said that more and more of their students (at least in the humanities) were taking up voluntary work such as helping in orphanages, visiting elderly people, donating blood. The students organize such activities themselves, but clearly there is a national mood going round the country. It is certainly helped by government-approved media. But that doesn’t mean that it is less real. Two years ago there were really devastating floods in the Russian Far East Thousands of homes destroyed, tens of thousands homeless. Through TV channels there were appeals for money and help, and thousands of students volunteered. Normal decent responses. But many teachers thought that the response was more vigorous than it would have been in earlier years. Also, following the example of Britain, much was made of student volunteers at the Sochi Olympic Games. I spoke to lots of students who went there as volunteers and they were as excited as their British counterparts. As a result it has become fashionable to be helpful and to volunteer for Russian activities. (And I do not use ‘fashionable’ cynically but as a way of tracing a trend.)

Moreover several respondents noted that students are more politically active. Of course they are a small minority, but bigger and noisier than they were. Here is an enthusiastic comment from one teacher in her thirties.

‘My students are very inquiring, I’ve been teaching for 11 years already and do think that the young people are more open, sensitive and what is really amazing – patriotic! About 10 years ago 90% of students of Foreign Languages Department wanted to leave the country and now they all want to stay, they broaden their horizon, get involved into many voluntary projects, they help so many people!’

Now I want to look at the other question. What do you think of the Immortal Legion. In Soviet times there were two important national holidays – 1st May and 9th May. 1st May – workers’ day – was so linked with the Soviet Union that it could not be celebrated except as a communist festival. So it is still a public holiday, but most of the population who can do so rush off to their dachas to begin planting for the summer season. It’s a spring break of several days.

9th May was celebrated in Soviet times as the great Victory Over Fascism Day. Military hardware was brought out onto Red Square, and in cities and towns up and down the country the army paraded and people both rejoiced in the repelling of invaders from their homeland and mourned the millions who had died. It has always been a public holiday but in the 1990s not so much was made of the display. The Russian Federation was not at war, the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union was about a different world in a different country, and Russians had other things to worry about.

In Putin’s time, not immediately but slowly, Victory Day has been brought back as a patriotic holiday, with the idea of uniting all the people. With 27 million dead, every Soviet family suffered deaths, let alone the wounded and traumatized who did return. And ‘Soviet people’ included of course the peoples living in what is now the Russian Federation. So this seemed to be a day to bring them all together.

Is it a day for showing off the military? Not nearly so much as it used to be – until this year when Putin made it clear that the display of military equipment did have a political agenda.

This year there was a huge official build-up to the 70th Anniversary. Everywhere were posters, declamations, exhibitions, people-participation in events before the great day. But also in response to aggressive and hostile actions by the west, there was also a lot of military stuff on display.

Several times, as carefully as I could, I raised the question of whether this was an appropriate public holiday 70 years after the event. ‘You no longer celebrate throwing Napoleon out of Russia. When are you going to stop celebrating throwing the Nazis out of Russia?’

And almost always the answer was as if I had seriously hurt the person I asked.

‘Karen, surely you understand – so many people died. And they died for us, and we must not forget that. Children forget so much these days so it is very important to tell them about their great-grandfathers.’

‘But why Victory? Isn’t this a bit too late for Celebrating Victory?’

‘It doesn’t mean that we are thinking of other peoples as enemies. It means that we are proud of ourselves.’

Now to the Immortal Legion or the Immortal Regiment. About four years ago in some Siberian city, a group of people decided to walk behind the usual marching soldiers and youthful cadets, holding home-made posters with a photograph of someone in their family who had been killed in the war. It was a local initiative which caught on very quickly and spread across the country. By 8th May 2015 (when I was in Perm as part of an official Oxford city delegation) thousands of Permians spent the evening making posters ready for a walk in a procession the next day. And so in Perm on May 9th, out in the big parade area we had ballet and soldiers, children, and a Perm-made tank that went all the way to Berlin, mounted on a lorry – that got big applause – and largish crowds. But after these displays there came, walking down Komsomolsky Prospect 30,000 Perm citizens, carrying posters. [Population – one million.]
It was entirely people-led; it was entirely civic, and it was very moving.

What did my respondents say. Almost all of them said that this was a wonderful idea that came from the people, represented the people, and gave pride and love to everyone. Even the most extreme sceptic said ‘On this matter I have not yet made up my mind’ which was some kind of grudging approval. But one young pacifist-humanist could not quite approve.

‘Again, a difficult question. On the one hand – Immortal Legion is a good idea for national rejoicing and preserving the national historical memory. It caught public’s attention and was widely shown on TV. But on the other hand – isn’t it better to show national rejoicing in some more socially useful arrangements? Helping the poor, orphans or even just planting trees. To my mind it was better, when some years ago we had a celebration of Victory day planting a pine tree and placing a sign with a name of relative, who died during the war. I think, our ancestors would have approved it more.’

One of the words that appeared in answers to these two questions about Civic Society was ‘patriotic’. It occurred quite often. And it raises the question of when ‘patriotism’ is a good thing and when it is not.

One of the accusations levelled against Putin by ‘the West’ is that he has encouraged nasty kinds of nationalism; that in order to bolster up Russia he has given quiet support to various neo-Nazi Russian groups.

I want to say something about this immediately. I do not doubt that there are unpleasant Russian ‘nationalists’, just as there are unpleasant British ‘nationalists’ quite a number of whom expect to see increasing attention to their views in this country. Russian neo-nazis have their websites, their anti-Muslim, anti-Semite, anti-Caucasian, anti-Ukrainian views. They have drunken fracas and they can be murderous. But I have never seen or heard any Russian approving of such groups – including the most fiercely patriotic and enthusiastic followers of official Russian propaganda. Of course I meet a selected number of people both in Russia and in Britain. I don’t meet extreme nationalists in Britain. But in both cases these people seem to be fringe groups, not welcomed at all by governments or officials.

On Victory Day in Moscow, as I said, the government brought out missiles and advanced armaments – the biggest display ever. In that sense Russian nationalism was to the fore. In a short speech Putin thanked the Americans, the British and other allies for helping to defeat Nazism in 1945 – and quietly indicated that they had chosen not to come on this 70th anniversary. He talked about the fight for humanity to which all these Russian citizens’ ancestors had contributed, And he showed off Russian strength to the foreign dignitaries.

Then – advancing on Red Square came a mass of ordinary people. And to the confusion of the Chinese President, Putin got down off the tribunal and went to join the walkers, carrying a picture of his own father who fought in the war. In this crowd he was one of half-a-million.

Is this an example of grotesque government propaganda? Is it an example of the President taking over the local civic demonstrations of the people? Or is it a way for the President to be part of the people. (He was after all, walking in the midst of thousands some of whom probably did not feel totally enthusiastic about him.)

Would Obama do this? Would Cameron? Does it matter?

I ask these questions as I come on to the last question which I sent out to my readers.

(8) Has Russia changed recently. And if so, for the better or the worse.

Some people said nothing much had changed except prices had gone up. Usually the implication seemed to be – life is generally dull or gloomy and we have to put up with it.

A smallish minority said it had definitely changed for the worse: no respect for human rights, too much Church-propaganda, terrible mass-media, a generally brain-washed population.

“Russia has changed for the worse because of the active governmental propaganda: all those talks about ‘external enemies of Russia’, ‘Russian spiritual bonds’, and ‘greatness of Russia’ make me sick.”

The majority however said, ‘Yes, something has changed. A coming together of people, a sense of being Russian with pride.’ So what makes one respondent sick is obviously related to the pride felt by others. Is it, though, more than grand words from top people transmitted through the population?

Here is a comment by a very thoughtful correspondent.

‘Russia has changed a lot for the last twelve years (not many changes since 2013, as I can see). There are very good things – for example, in bigger cities rather successful work against corruption is being held; people have become “sated” with food, goods and pleasures and are looking for something else. And still, there are things that seem to me sad and savage – the mentioned “closeness” of State and Church, some types of discrimination, censorship in media, for example.’

And now, from a provincial city – and I could have picked up many other comments:

‘I think Russia has changed and is changing for the better. People are becoming more patriotic, they are more confident in their future (you can see that by the number of babies being born) – our birth rate is definitely going up! More people are willing to work for the benefit of the country. Not only for their personal survival.

‘Another thing that I notice, since I am in touch with this sphere, is that they are closing down a lot of orphanages, because there are just too few children in them. They are merging several orphanages into one, because we don’t need that many any more. One reason is that less and less babies and children are abandoned and the other thing is that a lot are being adopted. There is a whole boom of adoptions, I know several families, who have adopted children even having their own ones. That is another positive tendency that says that people are becoming more empathic to others, they are not only centered around their personal lives, but looking outward, trying to help their “neighbours”.

‘A national idea is being formed again, which has been sadly lacking after the fall of the USSR.’

Or as someone else put it:

“This did not happen overnight but gradually. The people are straightening their shoulders…”

I could go on but I will leave it there and wait for questions.

Answers came from: Arkhangelsk, Barnaul, Belgorod, Blagoveshensk, Chelyabinsk, Chita, Khabarovsk, Kolomna, Krasnodar, Kurgan, Kursk, Magnitogorsk, Moscow, Naberezhny Chelny, Novgorod, Omsk, Perm, Piatigorsk, Rostov-on-Don, Samara, St Petersburg, Tomsk, Tula, Tver, Ulan-Ude, Vladivostok and Yekaterinburg.

Extra contributions which are of interest:

Are you more or less satisfied with the annexation of Crimea?

‘Yes. In 2010 (. ) I had a backpacking summer travel in the Crimea and stayed overnights at dozens of ordinary homes I had never known before. I returned to Russia rather startled with the poverty and despair those people lived in, as well as with their strong resolution to start military actions against Kiev, in case the Ukrainian government proceeded with the pro-NATO policy and turned their back on Russia. Lots of people were keeping arms in the cellars (I saw that!!) and men spoke about their readiness to defend “Crimea, the Russian land” (as one Cossack, aged 30 said, “We are Russian, and if Kiev ever trenches on our right to be Russian, we are organized, armed and ready to combat, we’ll defend our land”). The atmosphere of hatred between various parts of Ukraine was shocking and really frightening. It was evident, it couldn’t last long.’

‘So, what I want to say is: 1) the conflict in Ukraine is a result of long-time domestic tensions; 2) any forces that have been fueling the conflict are merely using the ground that became badly ill because of unwise actions of the Ukrainian leaders in the 00s; 3) the other scenario in March 2014 would have probably meant severest civil war in Ukraine, with much more drastic consequences for Ukrainians than they are having now.’

(4) The Russian government has repeatedly called for a negotiated peace settlement in Eastern Ukraine, and worked at the Minsk 1 and then the Minsk 2 agreements. Is there anything more – anything practical – that the Russian government can do to bring about peace?

‘I think no, because it’s not our problems, really I don’t understand why whole World asks Russia to make something for peace. The problem first considered Ukraine, their politic, economic and social habits, they make it by own causes. Many of Ukraine people wants to live in Russia, EC and other countries, because they can’t live in Ukraine. What and why should we do else. Russia helps refugees, but EC and USA don’t, so why?’

Has Russia changed for better or worse?

(An extreme view, but one which is supported (or seems to be supported) by official government propaganda.) ‘I do not want my children to live according to European stereotypes and standards – and they, to put it mildly, have degraded recently, if to recall only the gay policy. This is DEGRADATION of the moral values and this is diseased mind which is being imposed on Russia, a strong and independent nation. I do not want to live among gays and lesbians. These are abnormal cases which are popularized by mighty Europeans and Americans, who want to control the world, but are actually losing the game, because it’s impossible to oppress people who have their own identities (Russians, Muslims, Jews…).’

By Paul Kirby
BBC News

Watch: Our parents wouldn’t leave Bucha, then Russia moved in

Vladimir Putin unleashed the biggest war in Europe since World War Two with the justification that modern, Western-leaning Ukraine was a constant threat and Russia could not feel «safe, develop and exist».

Thousands of people have since died, towns and cities such as Mariupol lie in ruins and 13 million people have been displaced. But the questions remain: what was it all for and how will it end?

What was Putin’s original goal?

The Russian leader’s initial aim was to overrun Ukraine and depose its government, ending for good its desire to join the Western defensive alliance Nato. After a month of failures, he abandoned his bid to capture the capital Kyiv and turned his ambitions to Ukraine’s east and south.

Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov spoke of freeing Ukraine from oppression while foreign intelligence chief Sergei Naryshkin argued «Russia’s future and its future place in the world are at stake».

Ukraine’s democratically elected president, Volodymyr Zelensky, said «the enemy has designated me as target number one; my family is target number two». His adviser said Russian troops made two attempts to storm the presidential compound.

Russia’s leader refused to call it an invasion or a war. Moscow continues to coin Europe’s biggest war since 1945 a «special military operation».

The claims of Nazis and genocide in Ukraine are completely unfounded but part of a narrative repeated by Russia for years. «It’s crazy, sometimes not even they can explain what they are referring to,» complained Ukraine’s foreign minister Dmytro Kuleba.

And it is Russia that is now accused by the international community of carrying out war crimes. Several countries including the US and Canada go further and call it genocide.

After so much destruction, the Russian leader’s words ring very hollow now: «It is not our plan to occupy the Ukrainian territory; we do not intend to impose anything on anyone by force.»

How have Putin’s aims changed?

The Kremlin claimed it had «generally accomplished» the aims of the invasion’s first phase, which it defined as considerably reducing Ukraine’s combat potential. But it became clear from Russia’s withdrawal that it had scaled back its ambitions.

«Putin needs a victory,» said Andrei Kortunov, head of the Russian International Affairs Council. «At least he needs something he can present to his constituency at home as a victory.»

Russian officials are now focused on seizing the two big eastern regions and creating a land corridor along the south coast, east from Crimea to the Russian border. They have claimed control of the southern region of Kherson and a leading Russian general has said they have hopes of seizing territory further west along the Black Sea coast towards Odesa and beyond.

«Control over the south of Ukraine is another way out to Transnistria,» said Maj Gen Rustam Minnekayev, referring to a breakaway area of Moldova, where Russia has some 1,500 troops.

If Russia does capture both eastern regions, it will most likely try to annexe them after a sham vote, as it did with Crimea in 2014. Ukraine also accuses occupying forces in Kherson of planning a referendum on creating separatist entity: they are already introducing Russia’s currency, the rouble, from 1 May.

The powerful head of Russia’s security council, Nikolai Patrushev, has spoken of Ukraine disintegrating into «several states», blaming Ukrainian and Western hatred of Russia.

The question is whether Russian forces have the numbers to press forward. By not declaring this a war, the Kremlin cannot mobilise nationally and military analyst Michael Kofman believes unless that happens Russia’s Donbas offensive is the last it can attempt.

Is there a way out?

There is little sign of any negotiated end to this war in the immediate future.

A few weeks into the war, Russia said it was considering a Ukrainian proposal of neutrality, but there have been no negotiations since the end of March.

President Putin told the UN Secretary General at the end of April «we are negotiating, we do not reject [talks]», but he earlier declared negotiations at a dead end. After a meeting with the Russian leader, Austrian Chancellor Karl Nehammer gave a very downbeat assessment of a man who had entered into a «logic of war».

Ukraine’s Volodymyr Zelensky had already accepted that Ukraine would not join Nato: «It’s a truth and it must be recognised.» But after apparent Russian atrocities came to light in Bucha, Mariupol and elsewhere, he made it clear there would be no more talks until Russia withdrew from all territories seized since 24 February.

In its offer of neutrality proposed at the end of March, Kyiv said:

But neutrality for Vladimir Putin was never likely to be enough.

«Ultimately [Putin] wanted to divide the country and I think it’s becoming more evident that’s what he wants,» says Barbara Zanchetta of King’s College London’s Department of War Studies.

While the Kremlin wants to annex some areas of Ukraine, Tatiana Stanovaya believes «much more important is the fate of Ukraine: Putin wants to end Ukraine as a current state».

How Putin sees Ukraine

Russia’s leader has sought to reverse that, seeing the fall of the Soviet Union as the «disintegration of historical Russia». He has claimed Russians and Ukrainians are one people, denying Ukraine its long history and seeing today’s independent state merely as an «anti-Russia project». «Ukraine never had stable traditions of genuine statehood,» he asserted.

It was his pressure on Ukraine’s pro-Russian leader, Viktor Yanukovych, not to sign a deal with the European Union in 2013 that led to protests that ultimately ousted the Ukrainian president in February 2014.

Russia then seized Ukraine’s southern region of Crimea and triggered a separatist rebellion in the east and a war that claimed 14,000 lives.

As he prepared to invade in February, he tore up an unfulfilled 2015 Minsk peace deal and accused Nato of threatening «our historic future as a nation», claiming without foundation that Nato countries wanted to bring war to Crimea. He has lately accused Nato of using Ukraine to wage a proxy war against Russia.

What’s Putin’s problem with Nato?

Ahead of the war, he demanded that Nato turn the clock back to 1997 and reverse its eastward expansion, removing its forces and military infrastructure from member states that joined the alliance from 1997 and not deploying «strike weapons near Russia’s borders». That means Central Europe, Eastern Europe and the Baltics.

In President Putin’s eyes, the West promised back in 1990 that Nato would expand «not an inch to the east», but did so anyway.

That was before the collapse of the Soviet Union, however, so the promise made to then Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev only referred to East Germany in the context of a reunified Germany. Mr Gorbachev said later that «the topic of Nato expansion was never discussed» at the time.

And the context in the 1990s was very different, says Barbara Zanchetta: «It was not done as a provocation, there was a partnership for peace.»

Nato maintains it never intended to deploy combat troops on its eastern flank, until Russia annexed Crimea illegally in 2014.

Does Putin have designs beyond Ukraine?

If he has, his military setbacks in Ukraine may have put paid to any wider ambitions beyond its borders. The most immediate threat is to Moldova, which is not part of Nato and has already come under Russian threat.

But President Putin’s ambition to roll Nato back to the late 1990s has taken a hit, with Finland and Sweden looking closely at joining an alliance that now seems as unified as ever. «He has triggered the opposite effect of what he wanted. He wanted to weaken Nato but Nato is now much stronger,» says Barbara Zanchetta.

Nato has warned of a war that could last weeks, months or even years, and said its members need to be prepared for a long haul.

Russia has already punished two Nato members, Poland and Bulgaria, for the West’s support for Ukraine, by cutting off their gas supplies.

Having witnessed Mr Putin’s willingness to lay waste to European cities to achieve his aims, Western leaders are now under no illusion. US President Joe Biden has labelled him a war criminal and German Chancellor Olaf Scholz believes «Putin wants to build a Russian empire. he wants to fundamentally redefine the status quo within Europe in line with his own vision.»